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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the sources of the widely noticed reduction in the volatility of
American business cycles since the mid 1980s. Our analysis of reduced volatility emphasizes the
sharp decline in the standard deviation of changes in real GDP, of the output gap, and of the inflation
rate.
The primary results of the paper are based on a small three-equation macro model that
includes equations for the inflation rate, the nominal Federal Funds rate, and the change in the output
gap. The development and analysis of the model goes beyond the previous literature in two
directions. First, instead of quantifying the role of shocks-in-general, it decomposes the effect of
shocks between a specific set of supply shock variables in the model’s inflation equation, and the
error term in the output gap equation that is interpreted as representing “IS” shifts or “demand
shocks”. It concludes that the reduced variance of shocks was the dominant source of reduced
business-cycle volatility. Supply shocks accounted for 80 percent of the volatility of inflation before
1984 and demand shocks the remainder. The high level of output volatility before 1984 is accounted
for roughly two-thirds by the output errors (demand shocks) and the remainder by supply shocks.
The output errors are tied to the paper’s initial decomposition of the demand side of the economy,
which concludes that three sectors  ￿ residential and inventory investment and Federal government
spending, account for 50 percent in the reduction in the average standard deviation of real GDP when
the 1950-83 and 1984-2004 intervals are compared.
The second innovation in this paper is to reinterpret the role of changes in Fed monetary
policy. Previous research on Taylor rule reaction functions identifies a shift after 1979 in the Volcker
era toward inflation fighting with no concern about output, and then a shift in the Greenspan era to
a combination of inflation fighting along with strong countercyclical responses to positive or
negative output gaps. Our results accept this characterization of the Volcker era but find that
previous estimates of Greenspan-era reaction functions are plagued by positive serial correlation.
Once a correction for serial correlation is applied, the Greenspan-era reaction function looks almost
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“For well over a century business cycles have run an unceasing round.  They have 
persisted through vast economic and social changes; they have withstood countless 
experiments in industry, agriculture, banking, industrial relations, and public policy; 
they have confounded forecasters without number, belied repeated prophecies of a 
“new era of prosperity” and outlived repeated forebodings of “chronic depression.” 
– Arthur F. Burns (1947, p. 27) 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The joy of macroeconomics lies not only in its intrinsic importance to the 
solvency of governments and the welfare of ordinary citizens, but also in its endlessly 
changing topics and methods.  Less than 20 years ago I edited an epochal volume with a 
star-studded1 cast of authors, The American Business Cycle (Gordon, 1986), and began my 
introduction to that volume with support for Burns’ theme that business cycles 
continued their “unceasing round,” reminding readers that the recently completed 
1981-82 recession was the deepest postwar slump, and that previous conferences and 
comments that the “business cycle is obsolete” had proved to be wildly premature.2 
Now, the tables have turned once again.  In the tradition of instant obsolescence 
that has always marked macroeconomic pronouncements, going back to the universal 
view in 1929 that an era of permanent prosperity had arrived, that 1986 volume 
                                            
1.  Star-studded? An alphabetical list of last names of a subset of authors and discussants will 
suffice: Baily, Barro, Bernanke, Blanchard, Blinder, Deaton, DeLong, Dornbusch, Eckstein, Eisner, 
Fischer, Grossman, Hall, McCallum, Meltzer, Moore, Shiller, Sims, Sinai, Summers, Taylor, Temin, 
Watson, Zarnowitz 
2.  Citations for the premature view included the Bronfenbrenner (1969) volume Is the Business 
Cycle Obsolete?  Also cited were a remark by Paul Samuelson that “the NBER has worked itself out of   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 2 
 
attesting to the permanence of business cycles  appeared just as the relevance of its main 
themes to erode.  As documented by Blanchard-Simon (2001), Stock-Watson (2002, 
2003), and others, the year of our conference, 1984, marked a sharp change from high to 
low American business cycle volatility.3      
The topic of this paper is the decline in the volatility of the American business 
cycle over the entire postwar era, defined as 1948 to early 2005.  Since by almost any 
measure the most severe postwar business cycle was the recession of 1981-82, it is not 
surprising that the recent literature dates the decline in volatility at the period 1984-86 
immediately after the end of that severe recession.  This paper documents and 
reinforces the common view that the break in volatility occurred in the mid-1980s, but 
this paper is not about dating but rather about causes.  Our examination of the decline 
in business-cycle volatility primarily focuses on the  standard deviation of changes in 
real GDP and of the level of the output gap, that is, the log ratio of actual to natural real 
GDP.  We also place substantial emphasis on the even greater decline in the volatility of 
inflation, both because inflation is a goal of economic policy in itself, and also because 
volatile inflation feeds back to make output more volatile.   
The set of causes that receive most emphasis in explaining the drop after 1984 in 
                                                                                                                                             
one of its first jobs, namely, the business cycle” (Zarnowitz, 1972, p. 167). 
3.  The conference was held at the Dorado Beach Hotel, Puerto Rico, 22-25 March, 1984, almost 
exactly at the moment when retrospective historical research has determined that the American business 
cycle experienced a sharp and permanent decline in volatility (see Figure 1 below).   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 3 
 
postwar business cycle volatility is quite different than the older literature that attempts 
to explain why postwar (i.e., post-1948) business cycles were milder than the Great 
Depression or more generally milder than all the business cycles that occurred before 
1929.  The earlier literature takes as its point of departure Arthur Burns’ AEA 
Presidential Address (1960).  In his analysis the first and most important cause of 
postwar stability was the greatly increased size of the Federal government (as 
compared to pre-1929), particularly the automatic stabilizers inherent in government 
transfer payments and the personal income tax system.  Also in the front rank of causes 
were the reduced procyclical volatility of the money supply, as well as other money-
related regulatory reforms of which the 1934 introduction of Federal deposit insurance 
must have been the most important.  
But the literature on the decline in business cycle volatility within the postwar 
era, e.g., before and after 1984, centers on quite a different set of causes.  There is no 
discussion of the stabilizing effect of the Federal government, since the role of Federal 
government spending is now recognized to be destabilizing, as we will document 
below.  Modest attention is paid to structural change, especially the shift from volatile 
durable goods to stable services, but there have been no suggestions that such 
compositional changes have contributed substantially to reduced overall volatility.  
Rather, the “contest” in the assignment of causes for the recent decline in   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 4 
 
volatility pits two worthy opponents, an improvement in the conduct of monetary 
policy versus a reduction in the adverse impact on macroeconomic stability of “shocks.” 
 This paper provides a separate analysis of the role of demand shocks and supply 
shocks.  The reduced volatility of demand shocks is documented by examining the 
volatility of the major components of expenditures on GDP and their changes.  We 
focus on the reduced volatility of Federal government spending, of residential housing, 
and of inventory change,  as important sources of improved stability, and attribute 
these changes respectively to the reduced share of military spending in GDP, banking 
and financial market reforms, and information technology that improved sales forecasts 
and inventory management.    
This paper goes beyond the recent research, particularly Blanchard-Simon (2001) 
and Stock-Watson (2002, 2003), in building an explicit model that identifies and 
quantifies the role of supply shocks as the basic explanation of higher inflation volatility 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and of reduced inflation volatility in the 1990s.  This inflation 
equation is then joined together in a simple three-equation macro model by adding a 
Fed reaction function and an “IS” equation that quantifies the response of changes in 
the real GDP gap to changes in both inflation and in the short-term interest rate.  Using 
either a single equation for inflation or the three-equation model, we can quantify the 
effect on output and inflation volatility of both the set of supply shocks and changes in   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 5 
 
the Fed’s reaction function.   The role of demand shocks is quantified by examining the 
role of errors in the model’s IS equation for the output gap.   
The paper begins with quantitative evidence on several measures of business-
cycle volatility, then turns to the role of shifts in output shares and in sectoral volatility, 
and then tackles the paper’s major task, the estimation and simulation of the three-
equation macro model with its strong emphasis on the role of supply shocks in the 
inflation process.  The small macro model is not a symmetric VAR model.  Lag lengths 
and the role of levels versus rates of change are handled differently in each of the three 
equations.   However, despite its simplicity, the model provides a unique quantitative 
assessment of the sources of reduced inflation and output volatility after 1984. 
Our major conclusion is that both demand and supply shocks mattered, and 
changes in monetary policy mattered much less in achieving the reduced volatility of 
both inflation and output.  A key concept in our analysis of the three-equation model is 
the “output error,” that is the residual variation of the output gap that cannot be 
explained by responses to lagged inflation and interest rates.  The output error 
represents “IS shifts” such as changes in military spending and volatile residential 
investment caused by inefficient pre-1984 financial regulations and institutions.   Most 
of the reduced volatility of inflation after 1984 was caused by the behavior of supply 
shocks and the remainder by reduced volatility of the output error, i.e., IS shifts.   About   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 6 
 
two-thirds of the reduced volatility of the output gap is attributed to the output error, 
with a small remaining role for supply shocks.    
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this paper is that there has been no change 
 in monetary policy after 1990 compared to the policies pursued before 1979, taking a 
narrow view of policy as the response coefficients in a Taylor Rule monetary policy 
reaction function.4  Policy was different only in the 1979-90 Volcker interval, when 
fighting inflation was paramount and no weight was given to stabilizing output.5  Our 
results overturn other research that finds strong emphasis on inflation fighting not just 
during 1979-90, but after 1990 as well.  We show that previous estimates of Taylor Rule 
reaction functions are plagued by serial correlation.  Once an autoregressive correction 
is applied to the Taylor Rule equation, the post-1990 “Greenspan” policy turns out to 
look much the same as the pre-1979 “Burns” policy; both are equally different from the 
1979-90 inflation-fighting “Volcker” policy.  If the Volcker function had been in effect 
throughout 1965-2004 instead of the succession of Burns-Volcker-Greenspan functions 
actually in effect, the fight against inflation would have started in the mid 1970s instead 
of 1981-82, the 1975 recession would have been deeper but the 1981-82 recession 
shallower, the pre-1984 volatility of the output gap about the same, and the pre-1984 
                                            
4.  This result does not deny that monetary policy might have improved in a broader sense, with 
better communication and transparency and credibility acquired from the pre-1990 fight against inflation. 
5.  We date the transition between the Volcker and Greenspan eras as occurring in 1990 rather 
than 1987, because Fed behavior in 1987-90 resembles the Volcker set of responses more than the   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 7 
 
rate of inflation somewhat lower. 
 
II.  Measures of Reduced Business-Cycle Volatility 
 
Four-quarter Changes in Real GDP 
 
   Perhaps the clearest way to become convinced of the decline in business cycle 
volatility over the postwar era is to study the plot in the top frame of Figure 1, showing 
four-quarter changes in the growth rate of real GDP over the 229 quarters between 
1948:Q1 and 2005:Q1, spanning the entire quarterly data base of the U. S. National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  The top frame also plots a horizontal line 
representing the mean growth rate of real GDP over this period, which is 3.39 percent 
per annum.   
As shown in the top frame of Figure 1, the four-quarter percentage changes 
behave very differently before and after 1984.   Prior to 1984, there are sharp zigs and 
zags, while after 1984 the fluctuations are much more moderate.  The pre-1984 
fluctuations are equally severe above and below the mean of 3.39 percent per year.  In 
contrast, there is nothing like that experience of volatility after 1984.  The four-quarter 
growth rate of real GDP was never negative over the entire 22-year period between 
1983:Q1 and 2005:Q1 except in the brief interval associated with the 1990-91 recession, 
namely 1991:Q1-Q3.  In fact, some doubt has been cast on the NBER’s declaration of a 
                                                                                                                                             
Greenspan set of responses.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 8 
 
recession in early 2001, because the four-quarter change in real GDP never became 
negative in that episode and indeed in Figure 1 never fell below +0.2 percent in any 
quarter in 2001. 
Corresponding to the decline in volatility evident in the top frame of Figure 1 is a 
measure of that volatility displayed in the bottom frame, the rolling 20-quarter standard 
deviation of the four-quarter growth rate of real GDP.  There was a sharp and 
apparently permanent decline after 1987 to a range of 0.5 to 1.5 percent.  Because the 
calculation of the rolling standard deviation as a 20-quarter mean causes the post-1983 
drop in volatility to be reflected five years later, we can dramatize the movement 
toward stability by splitting the time period of the bottom frame of Figure 1 at 1987:Q4.  
The mean of the standard deviations plotted in the bottom frame of Figure 1 is 2.76 
percent for 1952:Q4-1987:Q4 and a much lower 1.25 percent for 1988:Q1-2005:Q1.   
The Output Gap 
In principle part of the variance of real GDP changes could reflect changes in the 
growth rate of natural real GDP, and we would not consider these changes to reflect 
business cycle volatility.  The top frame of Figure 2 depicts the log output ratio or 
“output gap” as a percent (100 times the log ratio of actual to natural real GDP).    The 
dividing line of shifting output volatility at the year 1984 is not quite as stark in Figure 2 
as in Figure 1, partly because the output gap is a level rather than a rate of change and   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 9 
 
thus cumulates and partially smooths out the volatile pre-1984 rates of change shown in 
Figure 1.  However, there is still ample evidence of a decline in the volatility of the 
output gap after 1984.  The bottom frame quantifies the shift in the volatility of the 
output gap by plotting (in parallel with Figure 1) its rolling 20-quarter standard 
deviation.  There is less dramatic evidence in the bottom frame of Figure 2 of a post-
1984 drop in output volatility than in Figure 1.  The volatility of the four-quarter 
changes drops by 55 percent when 1952-87 is compared with 1988-2005, while the 
volatility of the output gap drops by a smaller 42 percent: 
Inflation and Output Volatility  
An important source of high output volatility before 1984 was high inflation 
volatility, and we show later that the reduction of inflation volatility after 1984 made a 
substantial contribution to the post-1984 decline in output volatility.  We will also show 
that high inflation volatility prior to 1984 can be linked to the behavior of an explicit set 
of supply shock variables.  Figure 3 compares the 20-quarter standard deviation of four 
quarter changes in real GDP and the GDP deflator, where the close relationship 
between output and inflation volatility is evident in the 1974-88 period.  We also note 
that output volatility was relatively high in 1952-1962 despite the low volatility of 
inflation, and that very low inflation volatility in 2000-05 did not prevent an increase in 
output volatility associated with the 2001 recession and subsequent recovery.  The   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 10 
 
averages of the rolling 20-quarter standard deviations for output and inflation are as 
follows: 
Rolling 20-quarter 
standard deviation                 1952:Q4-1972:Q4     1973:Q1-1987:Q4   1988:Q1-2005:Q1 
 
Four quarter change in: 
 
Real GDP                         2.69      2.87      1.25 
GDP Deflator                                1.11       1.67      0.48 
 
The fact that output volatility was so high during 1952-72, despite relatively low 
inflation volatility, suggests that the role of shocks as a cause of high output volatility 
should include not only supply shocks but also demand shocks, including changes in 
military spending. 
 
III.  Sectoral Shifts in Volatility and Spending Shares 
 
A simple method to learn about the sources of reduced output volatility is to 
decompose spending on GDP into its eleven major components.  We can ask which 
components had the greatest and least declines in volatility, and we can also determine 
if shifts in shares of spending among the components contributed to the overall 
reduction in volatility, e.g., by a shift from volatile investment spending and Federal 
government spending to relatively stable spending on consumer services.   
The top section of Table 1 displays the standard deviation of the four-quarter 
changes in eleven components of spending on GDP over the 1950-83 and 1983-2005   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 11 
 
intervals.6  In the top section of the table only one component, nonresidential structures, 
was more volatile in the second interval than in the first.  Most components had a 
smaller percentage decline in volatility than real GDP, indicating that the reduction of 
volatility for total GDP was aided by an increase in the negative covariance across the 
components.  Only two components, investment in residential structures and federal 
government spending, had a larger decline in volatility than total real GDP.   Somewhat 
surprisingly, inventory investment had virtually no decline in volatility, although we 
subsequently qualify this conclusion with a different measurement technique.7      
The bottom section of Table 1 shows the percentage shares of each of the eleven 
components in nominal GDP.  Did shifts in the spending shares cause the economy to 
become more or less volatile?  The largest increases in shares were for exports and 
imports, both much more volatile than real GDP as a whole.  Going in the opposite 
direction are the increases in the shares of consumption of services, which is much less 
volatile than real GDP, and the decline in shares of structures investment and Federal 
government spending, which are more volatile than real GDP.   
                                            
6.  In Table 1 the standard deviations are calculated from the four-quarter changes over the entire 
interval shown, in contrast to Figures 1-3 where, for graphing purposes, the standard deviation is 
calculated over rolling 20-quarter periods and then averaged.   
7.  The four-quarter change in inventory investment cannot be calculated, since inventory 
investment is frequently negative.  As indicated in the note to Table 1, we took the first difference of 
inventory change, divided by a twenty-quarter moving average of inventory change, and then calculated 
the standard deviation of the resulting ratio.  One reason for the low value of the standard deviation in both 
periods is that much of the volatility of inventory change appears in the twenty-quarter moving average 
and disappears in the ratio.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 12 
 
How much of the decline in overall real GDP volatility was caused by lower 
volatility in each component of spending, and how much by shifts in shares away from 
volatile components and toward more stable components?  Table 2 creates an artificial 
value for the standard deviation of total real GDP that is the sum of the standard 
deviations for the components (as shown in the top part of Table 1) times the nominal 
share of each component.  This sum, 5.05 percent for 1950-83 and 2.48 percent for 1984-
2005, is larger than the actual standard deviations of total GDP shown on the first line of 
Table 1, because the calculations in Table 2 ignore the complex covariances among all 
the components.  Intuitively, the calculations ignore  such covariance effects as the 
crowding out of investment by government spending, which automatically reduces 
economywide variance relative to the variance of the individual components.   
The first column of Table 2 records the sum of the component-by-component 
standard deviations in the two periods and their differences.  The second column 
replaces the actual component shares for the second period with the shares for the first 
period.  Compared to a -2.56 percent change in the actual sum of component standard 
deviations in the first column, there is a -2.32 percent change when shares are held 
constant, implying that changes in shares did contribute modestly to stabilization but 
explain only a small fraction of reduced volatility.  The third column shows the opposite 
combination, combining the actual 1984-2005 shares with the component standard   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 13 
 
deviations from the first period, and the reduction in the sum of standard deviations is 
only -0.58 points.  Our conclusion from Table 2 is that roughly 20 percent of the post-
1983 reduction in business-cycle volatility was due to shifts in shares toward more 
stable components and away from more volatile components, and the remaining 80 
percent was due to the reduction in volatility of each component.8     
Since improved business cycle volatility can be traced to a reduction in the 
volatility within the eleven components of spending, which components contributed the 
most?   The best way to answer this question is to use the BEA’s calculations of the 
contribution of each component to changes in real GDP.  Table 3 displays the standard 
deviation of the four-quarter moving average of these “contributions” of the eleven 
components, as well as the sum of those eleven standard deviations.  The standard 
deviations are displayed in the first column for 1950-83, in the second column for 1984-
2005, the difference in column three, and the percentage contribution of each 
component to the total in column 4.  By far the biggest contributor to lower volatility 
was Federal government spending, and almost as big a contribution was made by the 
sum of residential investment and inventory investment.  These three components 
contribute 73.9 percent of the total reduction in volatility, leaving the remaining 26.1 
percent to be contributed by the remaining eight sectors, particularly consumer durable 
                                            
8.  The 20 percent figure is the percentage ratio of -0.58 on the bottom line in the third column to  
-2.90, the sum of the numbers on the bottom line in the second and third columns.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 14 
 
and nondurable goods spending. 
However, the story told in the top section of Table 3 is incomplete, because it 
does not take into account the covariance among components, e.g., crowding out of 
private investment by government spending.  In order to examine the effects of these 
covariances, in the bottom section we compute the standard deviation of real GDP 
minus the contribution of specified components.  Excluding the three volatile 
components one-at-a-time yields modest or negligible reductions in volatility.   But 
when all three volatile components are excluded together, the contribution to stability is 
greater than when each is excluded separately.  Without the contribution of these three 
components the standard deviation of real GDP in the first period is 1.93 percent, or 61 
percent of the standard deviation of total real GDP.  In the second period excluding 
these three components yields a standard deviation of 1.19 percent, or 74 percent of the 
standard deviation of total real GDP.  The reduction in volatility across the two periods 
is -0.74 points when the three components are excluded compared to -1.53 points for 
total real GDP, indicating that these components account for half of the reduction in 
volatility.  This contrasts with our conclusion in the top section of the paper that these 
same three components accounted for 74 percent of the decline in volatility.  The 
smaller contribution in the bottom half of the table reflects the covariances among the 
three components.   These results seem to suggest that sector-specific structural changes   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 15 
 
on the demand side of the economy may have been as important as inflation-related 
supply shocks in achieving overall economic stabilization.  This is particularly evident 
in Figure 3, which shows that inflation volatility was relatively low yet output volatility 
was relatively high during the interval 1957-67.9 
 
IV.  Inflation and the Role of Supply Shocks 
 
The rest of this paper develops a small econometric model to assess the role of 
changes in demand and supply shocks and in monetary policy as causes of reduced 
business-cycle volatility during the post-1983 period.  Our approach differs from that of 
Blanchard-Simon (2001), who called attention to many of the same factors, including the 
correlation between output and inflation volatility (displayed in Figure 3 above), but 
who did not develop an econometric model to quantify the exact role of the different 
causes.  Our approach is closer to that of Stock-Watson (2003), who used several 
different macroeconometric models to assess the role of less volatile shocks. 
Like Stock-Watson (S-W)’s “SVAR” model (2002, p. 154), our model consists of 
three equations, one each for the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate following a 
Taylor rule specification, and output (what S-W call the “IS” equation).10   However, we 
                                            
9.  A detailed analysis of the role of financial innovations in achieving the reduced volatility of 
residential housing and consumption spending is provided by Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2005). 
10.  As shown in Table 5 below, the model contains a fourth equation that translates the output 
gap into the unemployment gap.  This fourth equation plays no essential role in the analysis and could   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 16 
 
go beyond Stock-Watson in our specification of the inflation process.   Instead of 
subsuming all of the supply shocks in the inflation equation into the error term, as do 
Stock-Watson in their “SVAR” model, we use a more tightly specified inflation equation 
in order to identify the nature of the supply shocks.  Thus when we ask the question, 
“how much would the volatility of inflation and output have been reduced with no 
inflation shocks?” we will be setting to zero a specific set of “shock” variables, not the 
error term in the inflation equation.  Later we will go beyond the inflation equation to 
discuss the specification of the interest rate and output process; there we will also 
emphasize “shocks” in the responses of interest rates and output that are not directly 
related to the other endogenous variables in the model. 
The “Mainstream” Model of Inflation and the Role of Demand and Supply Shocks  
The inflation equation used in this paper is almost identical to that developed 25 
years ago (Gordon, 1982; Gordon-King, 1982).11  It builds on earlier work (Gordon, 1975, 
1977) that combined the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis with the role of 
supply shocks in directly shifting the inflation rate and creating macroeconomic 
externalities in a world of nominal wage rigidity.    The term "mainstream" model refers 
to a Phillips Curve that has three distinguishing characteristics — (1)  the role of inertia 
                                                                                                                                             
easily be substituted out of the model. 
11.  The “25 year” interval refers to the conference at which the 1982 paper was given in roughly 
its final form, held at Brookings in November, 1980.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 17 
 
is broadly interpreted to go beyond any specific formulation of expectations formation 
to include other sources of inertia, e.g., wage and price contracts; (2) the driving force 
from the demand side is an unemployment or output gap; and (3) supply shock 
variables appear explicitly in the inflation equation.12   The specific way that this general 
framework is specified in practice in this paper can be written as:   
 
pt  =  a(L)pt-1 + b(L)Dt + c(L)zt + et .  (1)  
 
 
Lower-case letters designate first differences of logarithms, upper-case letters designate 
logarithms of levels, and L is a polynomial in the lag operator.    
The dependent variable pt is the inflation rate.13 Inertia is conveyed by a series of 
lags on the inflation rate  (pt-1).  Dt is an index of excess demand (normalized so that Dt=0 
indicates the absence of excess demand), zt is a vector of supply shock variables 
(normalized so that zt=0 indicates an absence of supply shocks), and et is a serially 
uncorrelated error term.   Distinguishing features in the implementation of this model 
include unusually long lags on the dependent variable, and a set of supply shock 
variables that are uniformly defined so that a zero value indicates no upward or 
downward pressure on inflation.  
                                            
12.  The work of Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997, 2001) is included within the label "mainstream 
approach." 
13.  Note in particular that lower-case  p in this paper represents the first difference of the log of 
the price level, not the price level itself.    Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 18 
 
The estimated version of equation (1) includes lags of past inflation rates, 
reflecting the influence of several past years of inflation behavior on current price 
setting, through some combination of expectation formation, overlapping wage and 
price contracts, and buyer-supplier relations.  If the sum of the coefficients on the 
lagged inflation values equals unity, then there is a "natural rate" of the demand 
variable (DNt ) consistent with a constant rate of inflation.14   The basic equations 
estimated in this paper use current and lagged values of the unemployment gap as a 
proxy for the excess demand parameter Dt, where the unemployment gap is defined as 
the difference between the actual rate of unemployment and the natural rate, and the 
natural rate (or NAIRU) is allowed to vary over time.   
The estimation of the time-varying NAIRU combines the above inflation 
equation, with the unemployment gap serving as the proxy for excess demand, with a 
second equation that explicitly allows the NAIRU to vary with time: 
 
pt  =  a(L)pt-1 + b(L)(Ut-UNt ) + c(L)zt + et ,  (2) 
 
UNt  =  UNt-1 + ηt , Eηt  = 0, var(ηt )=τ2  (3) 
 
 
In this formulation, the disturbance term ηt in the second equation is serially 
                                            
14.  While the estimated sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation is usually roughly equal to 
unity, that sum must be constrained to be exactly unity for a meaningful "natural rate" of the demand 
variable to be calculated.      Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 19 
 
uncorrelated and is uncorrelated with et .  When this standard deviation τη = 0, then the 
natural rate is constant, and when τη is positive, the model allows the NAIRU to vary by 
a limited amount each quarter.  If no limit were placed on the ability of the NAIRU to 
vary each time period, then the time-varying NAIRU would jump up and down and 
soak up all the residual variation in the inflation equation (2).  
The starting point of this research is a particular version of the reduced-form 
inflation equation (2 above) that includes the gap between the actual unemployment 
rate and the NAIRU, as well as the lagged dependent (inflation) variable.  As in 
previous work this specification is augmented with four variables that are interpreted 
as supply shocks (the zt variables in (1) and (2) above), namely the change in the relative 
price of non-food non-oil imports, the effect on inflation of changes in the relative price 
of food and energy, the effect on inflation of changes in the relative price of medical 
care, the acceleration in the trend rate of productivity growth, and dummy variables for 
the effect of the 1971-74 Nixon-era price controls.15  Lag lengths were originally 
specified in Gordon (1982) and have not been changed since then.  
                                            
15.  The relative import price variable is defined as the rate of change of the non-food non-oil 
import deflator minus the rate of change of the dependent variable, e.g., GDP deflator or PCE deflator.  
The relative food-energy variable is defined as the difference between the rates of change of the overall 
PCE deflator and the "core" PCE deflator.  The Nixon control variables remain the same as originally 
specified in Gordon (1982).  Lag lengths remain as in 1982 and are shown explicitly in Table 4.  The 
medical care variable is defined in the same way as the food-energy variable, that is, as the difference 
between the inflation rate of the deflator for PCE or GDP, and the inflation rate for that deflator when 
medical care spending is deducted from total PCE or GDP.   The productivity trend is a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (using 6400 as the smoothness parameter) minus a six-year moving average of the same H-P trend.  
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Figure 4 displays four-quarter moving averages of the relative import price 
variable in the top frame and of the food-energy effect in the bottom frame.  The central 
role of the import price variable in explaining the spike of inflation in 1974-75 is clearly 
visible, as is its role in the Volcker disinflation of 1982-85, the accelerating inflation of 
the late 1980s, and the slowdown of inflation in 1997-99.   The food-energy effect, 
plotted in the bottom frame of Figure 4,  has somewhat different timing.  Note also the 
different orders of magnitude of the import and food-energy effects, reflecting the fact 
that they are defined differently.16  
In this paper we go beyond previous work by entering into the equation an 
additional "z" variable, specified exactly as in the case of food-energy prices, namely as 
the growth rate of the GDP (or PCE) deflator minus the growth rate of that deflator 
excluding expenditures on medical care services.  The top frame of Figure 5 plots the 
four-quarter moving average of the medical care effect, and this exhibits a succession of 
cyclically volatile positive values, i.e., medical care inflation was faster than the inflation 
rate in non-medical care goods and services.  The excess rate of medical care inflation 
peaked in 1988-93 and dipped in 1996-2000, helping to explain why inflation in the late 
                                                                                                                                             
of the medical care variable and the productivity trend variable, see Eller-Gordon (2003). 
16.  Namely, the import variable is the change in the relative price of imports, which reaches a 
peak of about 12 percent in 1974-75.  The food-energy variable is not the relative price of food and 
energy, but rather the difference between the growth rates of the PCE deflator including and excluding 
food and energy, and this variable peaks at 3.2 percent in 1974-75.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 21 
 
1990s was so low.   
Besides the addition of the medical care variable, the other major change in the 
current inflation equation involves productivity growth.  In previous papers the 
difference in the growth rates of actual and trend productivity have entered into the 
inflation equation, and this was called the "productivity deviation" variable.  But the 
difference between actual and trend growth misses the main impact of the post-1995 
productivity growth revival, which is the acceleration in the growth of the trend itself.   
Here we adopt the approach to trend estimation in Gordon (2003), and create a 
productivity trend growth acceleration variable equal to a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
version of the productivity growth trend minus a six-year moving average of the same 
trend.  This productivity trend acceleration variable is plotted in the bottom frame of 
Figure 5.  Its deceleration into negative territory during 1968-1983 might be as 
important a cause of accelerating inflation in that period as its post-1995 acceleration 
was a cause of low inflation in the late 1990s. 
Estimating the TV-NAIRU   
The time-varying NAIRU or “TVN” is estimated simultaneously with the 
inflation equation (2) above.  For each set of dependent variables and explanatory 
variables, there is a different TVN.  For instance, when supply-shock variables are 
omitted, the TVN soars to 8 percent and above in the mid-1970s, since this is the only   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 22 
 
way the inflation equation can “explain” why inflation was so high in the 1970s.  
However, when the full set of supply shocks is included in the inflation equation, the 
TVN is quite stable, as plotted in Figure 6.   
The TVN series associated with our basic inflation equation for the PCE deflator 
does not fall below 5.6 percent or rise above 6.3 percent over the period between 1962 
and 1988.  However, beginning in the late 1980s, the TVN drifts downwards until it 
reaches 4.5 percent in 1998, and then it gradually rises to a final value of 4.85 percent in 
2004:Q4.  Thus we concur with the general consensus that the TVN is currently roughly 
in the vicinity of 5.0 percent, but the TVN plotted in Figure 6 is distinctly lower over the 
1996-2000 period than the previous published series displayed for the PCE deflator in 
Gordon (1998), which reached a minimum value of 5.1 percent in mid-1998, in contrast 
to the 4.5 percent mid-1998 value shown in Figure 6. 
 
The Inflation Equation: Estimated Coefficients and Simulation Performance 
Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients for the triangle model's equation (2) 
for the GDP and PCE deflators.  The sum of coefficients on the lagged inflation terms is 
always very close to unity, as in previous research.17  The sum of the unemployment 
                                            
17.  The inclusion of lags 13-24 (years four through six) is strongly significant in an exclusion test 
at the 0.0000 confidence level.  As stated in the notes to Table 4, we conserve on degrees of freedom by 
including six successive four-quarter moving averages of the lagged dependent variable at lags 1, 5, 9, 13, 
17, and 21, rather than including all 24 lags separately.     Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 23 
 
gap variables is around -0.6, and this is consistent with a stylized fact first noticed in the 
1960s that the slope of the short-run Phillips curve is about minus one-half.  The 
consistency of our current results with that longstanding stylized fact provides evidence 
of the stability of the slope of the Phillips curve over time.   
Of the supply shocks, the change in the relative import price and relative food-
energy effect are consistently significant in both columns with plausibly sized positive 
coefficients. The coefficient on the relative price of non-food non-oil imports is 0.11 in 
the GDP deflator equation and 0.07 in the PCE deflator equation.  The PCE coefficient of 
0.07 is about half of the 14 percent share of imports in nominal GDP.  We would have 
expected the import-price coefficient to be smaller for the GDP deflator than for the PCE 
deflator, rather than the reverse, since imports are excluded from GDP but included in 
consumption.  As expected, the coefficients on the food-energy variable are much 
higher in the equation for the PCE deflator than for the GDP deflator, because imported 
energy is a part of consumption but not part of GDP.  The coefficient on the medical 
care effect is close to unity for both deflators.  The coefficients for the Nixon control 
variables are highly significant and have the expected signs and magnitudes similar to 
those in past research.   
While most papers presenting time-series regression results display coefficients, 
significance levels, and summary statistics, few go beyond that and display results of   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 24 
 
dynamic simulations.  Yet the performance of the inflation equation is driven in large 
part by the role of the lagged dependent variable terms, making dynamic simulations 
the preferable method for testing.  To run such simulations, the sample period is 
truncated ten years before the end of the data interval, and the estimated coefficients 
through 1994:Q4 are used to simulate the performance of the equation for 1995-2004, 
generating the lagged dependent variables endogenously.  Since the simulation has no 
information on the actual value of the inflation rate, there is nothing to keep the 
simulated inflation rate from drifting far away from the actual rate.  The bottom of 
Table 4 displays results of a dynamic simulation for 1995:Q1 to 2004:Q4 based on a 
sample period that ends in 1994:Q4.  Two statistics on simulation errors are provided, 
the mean error (ME) and the root mean-squared error (RMSE).   The simulated values of 
inflation are extremely close to the actual values, with a mean error over 40 quarters of 
only -0.13 for the GDP deflator equation and a minuscule -0.05 for the PCE deflator 
equation.  For both equations the RMSE of the simulations is substantially lower than 
the standard error of estimate for the 1962-94 sample period.  These simulation results 
are substantially better than those reported in Gordon (1998). 
Long Simulations with and without Supply Shocks 
The aim of the rest of the paper is to assess the role of shocks and changes in 
monetary policy as causes of the marked reduction in business-cycle volatility   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 25 
 
documented above.  The role of supply shocks in the inflation equation can be 
examined by running alternative simulations that use the full set of supply shock 
variables and alternatively set them to zero, either one at a time or together.18   We use 
the full set of information provided by our data, i.e., the coefficients presented above in 
Table 4, and run simulations of the inflation equation with the shock variables 
alternatively included and excluded. 
Figure 7 compares actual four-quarter changes in the PCE deflator with  a 
dynamic simulation of the PCE deflator equation for the 160 quarters between 1965:Q1 
and 2004:Q4, using the 1962-2004 period to estimate the coefficients as in Table 4.  The 
dynamic simulation stays on track remarkably well over this long period.  The same 
simulation is copied to Figure 8 and compared there with an alternative simulation that 
sets all supply shock variables to zero.  That is, inflation in this alternative simulation 
depends only on the simulated values of the lagged dependent variable terms plus the 
current and lagged values of the unemployment gap.   Simulated inflation with no 
shocks remains roughly equal to the full-shock simulation through early 1973 and then 
stays consistently below the full-shock simulation by a very large amount for the next 
30 years.  Since the only variable driving an acceleration or deceleration of inflation is 
                                            
18.  We cannot use the technique of truncating the sample period, as in the previous section, 
because we are particularly interested in the adverse supply shocks of the 1970s, and a simulation based 
on an equation truncated at, say, 1973 would have too little information and degrees of freedom to 
estimate coefficients on the supply shock effects.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 26 
 
the unemployment gap, the severe recessions of 1974-75 and 1981-82 cause marked 
declines in the inflation rate, moving into negative territory in 1981, with a further 
deceleration in 1991-92 and acceleration in 1995-2001.  Notice that the difference 
between the two simulations narrows in the late 1990s, since the full-shock simulated 
value of inflation fails to accelerate in 1995-2001, due to the role of beneficial supply 
shocks, while the no-shock simulated value accelerates by about 2.5 percentage points. 
The prediction of negative inflation in Figure 8 highlights the problem of running 
a single-equation simulation in a multi-equation world.  If there had been no adverse 
supply shocks in the 1970s, the recessions of 1974-75 and 1981-82 would have been 
much less severe or perhaps would not have happened at all.  To develop a more 
realistic quantitative assessment of what would have happened without supply shocks 
in the inflation process, we need to develop a small macro model that allows us to trace 
the chain of causation from lower inflation volatility to lower output volatility back to 
the behavior of the unemployment gap term in the inflation equation. 
 
V.  Properties of a Four-Equation Macro Model 
 
There are numerous small macro models that could be used in this study, but 
none of them include the explicit treatment of supply shocks that is needed adequately 
to address the sources of inflation volatility.  For instance, the “SVAR” model used by 
Stock-Watson (2002, 2003) subsumes the role of supply shocks into the error term rather   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 27 
 
than modeling their role explicitly.   The model developed in this paper starts with the 
inflation equation developed above and adds three extra equations.  In order to evaluate 
the role of changing monetary policy responses, we add an equation for the nominal 
Federal funds rate with the same approach based on the Taylor rule as in the SVAR 
model.  Monetary policy can then influence output directly, and inflation indirectly, in 
the third equation which makes the change in the output gap a function of lagged 
inflation and the change in the Federal funds rate.  Earlier we referred to this as a 
“three-equation” model, but for convenience we add a fourth equation that links the 
unemployment gap (the demand variable in the inflation equation) to current and 
lagged values of the output gap.  Using a notation that is consistent with the treatment 
of inflation above, the four-equation model can be written: 
 
pt  =  a(L)pt-1 + b(L)(Ut-UNt ) + c(L)zt + ept .  (4) 
 
 
Rt  =  T* + p* + d(L)(pt - p*) + f(L)Gt + eRt .  (5)  
 
 
ΔGt  =  h(L)Δpt-1 + j(L)ΔRt +  egt .  (6)  
 
 
Ut-UNt  =  k(L)Gt +  eUt .  (7)  
 
    
The symbol G stands for the level of the output or real GDP gap, that is, the log ratio of 
actual to natural real GDP, and ΔG stands for the first difference of the output gap.  The   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 28 
 
Taylor rule equation for the Federal Funds rate includes the Fed’s target for the real 
funds rate (T*), its target for the inflation rate (p*), a response including possible lags to 
the deviation of the actual inflation rate from the inflation target, and a response 
including possible lags to the level of the output gap.  The output gap equation makes 
the change in the gap a function of one or more lags of the first difference of the 
inflation rate and of the change in the interest rate.  Finally, the Okun’s law equation 
makes the level of the unemployment gap depend on the current value and one or more 
lags of the output gap.   
The columns of Table 5 list the four dependent variables in the model, with the 
middle columns providing alternative sets of results for the interest rate equation.  The 
choice of the three sub-intervals reflects apparent changes in Fed reactions 
corresponding roughly to the three periods identified by Stock-Watson (2003, Table 5), 
divided up in 1979:Q2 at the start of the Volcker period, and in 1990:Q2 at end of the 
period in which the Fed appeared to fight inflation aggressively while ignoring output 
deviations.  
The first column of Table 5 exhibits coefficients in the inflation equation for the 
GDP deflator, which is identical to the equation already discussed in the first column of 
Table 4.19   The three middle columns show estimated Taylor rule equations for three 
                                            
19.  While in principle the first columns of Tables 4 and 5 should be identical, there are some 
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periods split in 1979 and 1990.  As a shorthand, we will refer to the three sub-intervals 
respectively as the “Burns,” “Volcker,” and “Greenspan” responses.  Let us first 
examine the first set of coefficients shown for each sub-interval, labelled “AR(1) 
Correction?  No.”  These coefficients show that before 1979 the Burns Fed 
“accommodated” inflation, raising the nominal interest rate by less than half of any 
increase in the inflation rate, hence reducing the real interest rate and stimulating 
demand.  After 1979 the inflation response jumped from 0.45 to 1.46, so that the Volcker 
Fed raised the nominal Federal funds rate more than the increase of inflation above its 
target rather than less.  The Greenspan Fed continued to respond aggressively to higher 
inflation but also responded aggressively to the output gap, raising the nominal Federal 
Funds rate by almost a full percentage point in response to a one-percent positive 
output gap.   These coefficients reflect the widespread impression that the Greenspan 
Fed combined the best of both worlds, aggressively fighting inflation while also 
vigorously working to stabilize the output gap.  Indeed, these coefficients for the 
Greenspan Fed correspond very closely to those for several alternative models surveyed 
by Stock-Watson (2003, Table 5, p. 24). 
However, this consensus conclusion is flawed by the extreme degree of positive 
serial correlation evident in the interest rate equation, especially for the Greenspan 
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interval.   To summarize what follows, the Burns and Volcker coefficients survive a 
serial correlation correction with their Taylor Rule  coefficients essentially intact, but the 
Greenspan coefficients turn out to be fragile.  Let us take a simple version of the interest 
rate equation (5 above) with the fixed constant term and lagged effects suppressed: 
 




 eRt =  ρeRt-1 +uRt,    uRt~N(0,s).                                                                                          (9) 
 
 
To correct for the serial correlation represented by the positive value of ρ, we estimate 
equation (8) in the following alternative form:   
 
Rt  =   ρRt-1 + d(pt - p*) - ρd(pt - p*) + fGt - ρ fGt-1 + uRt .  (10) 
 
To correct for serial correlation, the interest rate equation was reestimated using 
“feasible general least squares” (FGLS), a procedure which estimates the basic equation, 
then regresses the residuals on their lag in order to find the autoregressive (ρ) 
coefficient, and then differences the terms based on that coefficient.20  The alternative 
results are shown in the columns in Table 5 labelled “AR(1) Correction?  Yes”.  The 
correction makes little difference for the Volcker coefficients and slightly increases both 
                                            
20.  I am grateful to my research assistant Ian Dew-Becker for noticing the serial correlation 
problem in the Greenspan equation and implementing the FGLS procedure to fix it.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 31 
 
the inflation and output gap responsiveness of the Burns reaction function.  But the 
effect on the Greenspan coefficients is substantively profound; the inflation response 
changes from an inflation-fighting 1.43 to an inflation-accommodating 0.57.  The 
coefficient on the output gap falls by one third from 0.95 to 0.60.  With the serial 
correlation correction, the Greenspan coefficients turn out to be almost identical to the 
Burns coefficients.  In this sense, compared to pre-1979, the Greenspan era represents no 
improvement in monetary policy at all!  All the model simulations displayed and 
discussed in the rest of this paper use the versions of the interest rate equation that are 
corrected for serial correlation.  
   The “IS” equation for the first difference of the output gap, shown in the next-to-
last column of Table 5,  shows an insignificant positive response to the first difference of 
the inflation rate, suggesting no direct feedback from a sharp increase of inflation to a 
sharp decrease in output as might have been suggested by the economy’s behavior in 
the 1970s.  The responses to changes in the nominal Federal funds rate are of plausible 
size and highly significant; an increase in the funds rate by 100 basis points causes a 
decline in the output gap by one percentage point with a long lag distributed over the 
next 10 quarters.21  The final column in Table 5 exhibits the Okun’s Law equation, 
                                            
21.  The current and first lags of the interest rate are omitted in the output gap equation because 
of simultaneity; in the short-run changes in output and interest rates tend to be positively correlated as “IS 
shifts” move the economy along the “LM curve.”   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 32 
 
showing that the unemployment gap responds to the output gap over the current and 
first two lagged quarters with a highly significant coefficient of -0.52. 
Single-Equation Model Simulations 
The aim of building the model is to use it to decompose the sources of business 
cycle volatility.  For this purpose we will focus on four different sources of volatility 
and its post-1983 reduction, namely set of supply shocks included in the inflation 
equation, the error term in the interest rate equation, the error term in the output gap 
equation, and shifts in the parameters in the interest rate equation that reflect changes in 
Fed policy.22  In this section we will examine the performance of each equation without 
model interactions; that is, each equation’s predicted values are examined using actual 
historical values for the endogenous explanatory variables.  Subsequently we will 
examine simulations that feed back simulated values of the endogenous variables.  
Having already examined the simulation performance and role of supply shocks 
in the inflation equation (see Figures 7 and 8 above), we now turn to the single-equation 
behavior of the interest rate equation, taking its explanatory variables as exogenous.   
All the simulations in this paper assume that the inflation target (p*) in equation (6) is 
2.0 percent and that the real interest rate target (T*) is 3.0 percent.   As in Table 5, the 
coefficients on inflation and the output gap are allowed to shift at 1979 and 1990.   The 
                                            
22.  No attention is paid to errors in the Okun’s law equation, which is viewed here as a purely 
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fitted performance of the equation is extremely close to the actual values, as shown in 
the top frame of Figure 9, which is no surprise in light of the correction for serial 
correlation.  Without that correction the equation (using the estimated coefficients 
shown in Table 5 without the AR(1) correction) miss three aspects of interest rate 
behavior after 1990.    First, the Fed’s “preemptive strike” of raising the nominal Federal 
funds rate sharply in 1994 is not captured by the equation.  Second, the flatness of the 
rate between 1995 and 2000 is not captured; a Taylor rule would have increased the rate 
substantially more in response to the move of the output gap from negative to positive.  
Finally, and most important, the Taylor rule approach cannot explain why the Fed 
reduced rates so fast and kept them so low in 2001-04.   
The central topic of this paper is the reduced volatility of the output gap, as 
already examined above in the two frames of Figure 2.  The predictive performance of 
the output gap equation is shown in Figure 10.  While the equation is estimated in first 
difference form, the actual and predicted values of the first differences are converted 
back to the level of the output gap for graphing in Figure 10.23   Clearly, the output gap 
has a life of its own that is not captured by the simple “IS” equation.   The output gap 
equation misses about half of the boom of the late 1960s and of 1973, and predicts a 
much smaller recession in 1974-75 than actually occurred.  In contrast, the equation’s 
                                            
23.  The errors in the first difference equation are translated into errors in the level of the output 
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predictions overstate the severity of the 1980-85 slump, fail to capture the output gap’s 
rise above zero in the late 1980s, and then completely misses the dynamics of the 1990s. 
 The economy is predicted to be stronger in the early 1990s than the late 1990s, and in 
response to the Fed’s aggressive rate reductions of 2001-04, the economy is predicted to 
be much stronger in the current decade than actually occurred. 
These errors in the output gap equation are not bad news for the model.  Rather, 
they remind us that output determination depends on far more than movements back 
and forth along the slope of a fixed IS curve, as is implied by our model which makes 
changes in interest rates the only significant source of changes in the output gap.  
Obviously shifts in the IS curve matter as well, and it would take a much more complex 
model to capture the sources of these IS shifts.  Missing from the predictions of the 
output gap equation in Figure 10 are such important events as Vietnam war spending in 
the late 1960s and the timing of the hi-tech investment boom of the late 1990s.  In the 
full-model simulations discussed below we will explore the effects of suppressing the 
error term in the output equation.  
Table 6 summarizes the single-equation results that are plotted in Figures 8, 9, 
and 10.  The top four lines calculate standard deviations of the actual values of the 
inflation rate, Federal funds rate, and level and first different of the output gap.  The 
reported standard deviations for the actual inflation rate and output gap are similar to   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 35 
 
those in our text discussions of Figures 2 and 3 above, with a decline in the standard 
deviation of the output gap of more than half after 1983, and a decline in the standard 
deviation of the inflation rate by almost 60 percent.  In contrast the volatility of the 
interest rate declined by much less, about 30 percent. 
How well do the simulations (for the inflation equation) and predicted values 
(for the other equations) replicate the lower standard deviations of the actual values?   
Simulated inflation falls by 68 percent, even more than the actual value, and simulated 
inflation declines substantially whether supply shocks are included or excluded.  
However, as we have seen in Figure 8 above, much of the pre-1984 inflation volatility in 
the “no-shocks” scenario is due to the role of deep recessions in forcing inflation into 
negative territory.  A full understanding of the role of supply shocks requires us to 
unleash the full set of model interactions, since without supply shocks in the 1970s there 
would not have been the spikes of the interest rate in 1981-82 nor the deep recession of 
1981-82. 
The single-equation predictions for the Federal funds rate differ from the other 
equations because the error term is so small, virtually eliminated by the serial 
correlation correction.  The predicted value for the interest rate has a decline in its 
standard deviation of 32 percent, identical to the actual decline of 32 percent.  The 
output gap equation yields a  predicted value that has a decline in its standard   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 36 
 
deviation of 51 percent, as compared to the actual decline of 55 percent.  Eliminating the 
error term in the output gap equation cuts the standard deviation by half before 1984 
and by about 40 percent after 1984, indicating that a reduction in the variance of the 
output error contributed to business cycle stabilization after 1983.     
Full-Model Simulations  
To assess the role in achieving reduced business-cycle volatility of supply shocks 
in the inflation equation, and of the error terms in the interest rate and output gap 
equations, we run full model simulations with alternative shocks set equal to zero, one 
at a time and then all together.    Table 7 contains five sections, one each for the 
standard deviation of  inflation, of the interest rate, and of the output gap, then the 
average value of inflation and the average absolute value of the output gap.  Within 
each section there are five lines corresponding to the full model simulations and 
alternative simulations that suppress the shocks one at a time and all together.  
The contrast between the single-equation and full-model simulations can be seen 
by comparing Tables 6 and 7.  Here is the percentage ratio of the standard deviations for 
1984-2004 relative to 1965-83 for each of the three variables, comparing the actual 
values, the single-equation simulation values, and the full-model simulation values. 
 
  Ratio of Standard Deviations, 1984-2004 to 1965-83 
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Inflation Rate   Interest Rate    ΔOutput Gap 
 
Actual  Values    41.7    68.6    49.1 
Single-Equation  Simulations  32.0    68.3    49.1 
Full-Model  Simulations   55.2    45.5    47.124 
 
 
The full-model simulations share with the single-equation simulations that they include 
the exogenous effects of the supply-shock variables in the inflation equation, as well as 
the error terms in the interest rate and output gap equations.  But they differ in that they 
use endogenous model-generated values rather than exogenous data-generated values 
for the endogenous variables in each equation.  While the model comes very close to 
duplicating the actual decline in the volatility of the output gap between the two 
periods, it understates the decline in the volatility of inflation and overstates the decline 
in the volatility of the interest rate.  
Turning back to Table 7, we can now discuss the relative role of the supply and 
demand shocks in explaining the model’s simulated volatility of the economy.  Because 
of the serial correlation correction, errors in the interest rate equation play no role in the 
explanation.  While Table 7 displays the effect of suppressing the interest rate errors, 
they make virtually no difference and are not discussed further.  We start with the 
alternative simulations for the inflation rate as described in the top section of Table 7.  
                                            
24.  The middle section of Table 7 displays the standard deviation of the output gap; this summary 
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For the first period, suppressing the supply shocks eliminates almost 80 percent of the 
standard deviation of inflation in the first period, while suppressing the output gap 
error eliminates about 20 percent of the standard deviation of inflation in the first 
period.  Suppressing supply shocks reduces the second-period standard error by about 
half and suppressing the output error reduces it by about one-third.  
Figure 11 illustrates the role of supply shocks and the output error in explaining 
the behavior of the inflation rate.  The dark solid line shows the full model simulation, 
which is virtually identical to the single-equation simulations depicted in Figures 7 and 
8.  The interest error has little effect, but suppressing the output error reduces the 
inflation rate by a roughly constant two to three percent throughout the simulation 
period.  Since the output equation cannot generate the excess demand of the late 1960s, 
without the output error the model forecasts less inflation throughout the full 40-year 
simulation period.  What remains when the output error is suppressed represents the 
combined contribution of the supply shocks, causing an acceleration of inflation of six 
percentage points between 1972 and 1975, and a reversal in which inflation decelerated 
by about five percentage points between 1981 and 1984.  Thus, ironically, the “Volcker 
disinflation” that has usually been attributed to monetary policy actually should be 
credited in part to the reversal of supply shocks, not just the decline in the real price of 
oil but also the effects of the dollar appreciation of 1980-85.    Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 39 
 
Turning to the Federal funds rate, Table 7 shows that in the first period 
eliminating supply shocks reduces the standard deviation of the interest rate by half,  as 
does eliminating the output error.   In the second period supply shocks have no impact 
in reducing volatility, but suppressing the output error reduces the standard deviation 
of the interest rate by more than half.   Thus much of the instability of the interest rate 
occurred through the effect of volatility of the output gap generated by the output error 
directly, and indirectly by the effect of the output error in generating high inflation, 
rather than by monetary policy or supply shocks. 
The simulations for the interest rate are displayed in Figure 12.  Due to the 
correction for serial correlation, suppressing the model’s own-equation interest rate 
errors makes virtually no difference.  Compared to the basic model simulation, 
suppressing the supply shocks makes a big difference in holding down the interest rate 
between 1974 and 1985, but after 1985 reduces the interest rate by only about one 
percentage point per year. Suppression of the output error also makes a big difference 
in reducing the interest rate throughout the 40-year simulation period, and particularly 
between 1977 and 1992.  Recall that eliminating the output error works directly through 
the output gap term in the interest rate equation and indirectly though the effect of a 
lower output gap in reducing the inflation rate and hence reducing the interest rate 
through the inflation term in the interest rate equation.     Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 40 
 
The next section of Table 7 tells a simple story, in which more than two-thirds of 
of the volatility of the output gap in the first period was caused by the output error and 
more than 80 percent in the second period.  Suppressing the supply shocks eliminates 
more than 40 percent of the output gap volatility in the first period but none in the 
second period.  Figure 13 displays  alternative simulations of the output gap.  
Suppressing the supply shocks converts the double recessions of 1975 and 1981-82 into 
a long period of prosperity, with the output gap bouncing around between +4 and -2 
over the entire 1975-92 period.  Suppressing the output error dampens fluctuations in 
the output gap but still leaves the economy vulnerable to the effects of supply shocks, 
particularly in 1975-85 when a decade-long recession would have occurred.  With no 
output error, the output gap in Figure 13 would have been very close to zero 
throughout 1987-2004.   
While this paper is about the reduction in business cycle volatility, particularly 
about the post-1983 reduction in the standard deviation of inflation and the output gap, 
the Fed’s objective as captured in the model’s interest rate equation is not the standard 
deviation of the inflation rate but rather its average value.  As for the output gap, the 
Fed’s goal is for the output gap to be zero, and hence to minimize the average absolute 
value of the output gap.  The bottom two sections of Table 7 report on the effect of 
shocks on these two central objectives of Fed policy.     Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 41 
 
Suppressing the supply shocks and the output error would each have reduced 
the inflation rate by two percentage points, or about 40 percent in the first period.  In 
the second period suppressing the supply shocks actually raises the inflation rate by 
more than one percentage point, since on balance during the second period the supply 
shocks were “beneficial” rather than “adverse.”  In contrast, suppressing the output 
error in the second period eliminates more than half of the inflation simulated by the 
full model.  In the first period suppressing the supply shocks eliminates one-third of the 
average absolute value of the output gap, whereas suppressing the output error 
eliminates slightly more than one half.  In the second period suppressing the supply 
shocks has little effect on the output gap, but suppressing the output error reduces its 
average absolute value by more than half. 
Overall, both the supply shocks and the output error contributed to the high 
volatility of inflation and the output gap before 1983, as well as to the high average 
value of inflation and the high average absolute value of the output gap.  Suppressing 
the supply shocks makes the economy’s behavior in the first period similar to its 
behavior in the second period, thus eliminating the puzzle of reduced volatility, and in 
fact suppressing the supply shocks makes average  inflation in the second period higher 
than in the first period.  Suppressing the output error makes the economy more stable 
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have been much smaller and less volatile in both periods, and without the output error 
we still would have had a puzzle of improved post-1983 volatility that would have been 
resolved by the role of the supply shocks.  
The Role of Changes in Monetary Policy  
As shown in Table 5 above, the Fed’s response to inflation and the output gap 
shifted over the three periods where breaks are allowed, 1960-79 (“Burns”), 1979-90 
(“Volcker”),  and 1990-2004 (“Greenspan”).  The big shift from Burns to Volcker was an 
increase in the response coefficient of the nominal Federal funds rate to an increase of 
the inflation rate (relative to the 2.0 percent target) from well below unity to well above 
unity, i.e., from an inflation-accommodation policy to an inflation-fighting policy.   The 
Volcker Fed cared only about fighting inflation and placed no weight at all on reducing 
the output gap.  After 1990 under Greenspan, inflation-fighting remained but the 
response to the output gap increased from zero to nearly unity, as is consistent with the 
Fed’s aggressive rate reductions in 1991-93 and 2001-02.   However, as we have seen in 
Table 5, the estimated coefficients for the Greenspan period are tainted by positive serial 
correlation.  When a serial correlation correction is applied, Greenspan’s credentials as 
an inflation fighter disappear, and the Greenspan coefficients emerge looking just like 
the Burns coefficients. 
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plots four alternative paths of the output gap; all these full-model simulations include 
the output error and all use the coefficients from Table 5 that are corrected for serial 
correlation.  The dark solid line labeled “split sample” allows the Taylor rule 
coefficients to shift across the three periods.  The other lines force the coefficients for a 
particular sub-interval to apply to the full forty-year simulation period.  Since the 
Volcker coefficients do not respond at all to output but respond strongly to inflation, it 
is not surprising that the Volcker coefficients imply deeper recessions in 1971 and 
especially in 1975-76.  Since this aggressive early response to inflation would have 
moderated inflation, a smaller recession in 1981-82 is implied.  Also, the Volcker 
coefficients, by not responding to the positive output gap in 1998-2001, would have 
allowed the output gap to go higher.  The Burns coefficients are not visible on the chart 
before 1979, since their effect is the same as the “split sample” line.  After 1979 the less 
aggressive response to inflation would have resulted in a milder recession in the early 
1980s.  The Greenspan coefficients yield roughly the same path as the Burns coefficients, 
with shallower recessions in both 1975 and 1981-82 than the Volcker coefficients.   
The simulation results from Figure 14 are summarized in Table 8.  The top 
section shows that if the Volcker coefficients had been in effect before 1979, the volatility 
of inflation would have been reduced by about 20 percent in both the first and second 
periods.  The Greenspan coefficients would actually have made the volatility of   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 44 
 
inflation slightly higher in the first period, albeit lower in the second period.  The next 
section shows that the Burns and Greenspan coefficients would have reduced the pre-
1984 volatility of interest rates by more than half, and even the Volcker coefficients 
would have reduced interest rate volatility somewhat by fighting inflation earlier and 
making the peak interest rates of 1980-81 unnecessary.   
Compared to the Volcker and split-sample  outcomes, either the Burns or 
Greenspan coefficients would have reduced the standard deviation of the output gap in 
the first period by about one-third, as well as the average absolute value of the output 
gap (bottom section of Table 8).  However, this improved performance on output 
volatility would have come at a cost of much higher inflation than the Volcker policy 
responses.  In fact, by failing to fight inflation aggressively, the Greenspan coefficients 
would have yielded post-1983 average inflation of almost 8 percent per year as 
compared to the 2.9 average yielded by the split-sample policies and 2.8 average 
yielded by the Volcker policies.   
Which set of policies was “best”?  There is no answer to that question without 
placing welfare weights on the average rate of inflation as compared to the average 
absolute value of the output gap.  If what counts is the economy’s performance in the 
long run, then the Volcker policies win the contest compared to the Burns or Greenspan 
policies.  Consider the contrast between the Volcker and Greenspan policies.  The   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 45 
 
Volcker response achieved 2 points lower inflation before 1984 at the cost of one extra 
percentage point of the average absolute value of the output gap, the classic inflation-
output tradeoff.  It is after 1984 that the payoff from the Volcker policies becomes 
evident, with full 5 percentage points less inflation than the Greenspan policies at the 
cost of only 0.43 higher average absolute output gap. 
Much of the long-run benefit of the Volcker inflation-fighting policies occurred 
through the creation of a large recession in 1975.  Would the verdict on the policies 
change if our simulations were to begin in 1979 instead of 1965, thus preventing the 
Volcker policies from having a counterfactual “head start”?  Table 9 is laid out as Table 
8, showing the effects of the alternative monetary policy reaction functions in 
simulations that cover 1979-2004 in the first column and 1990-2004 in the second 
column.   For the simulations starting in 1979, the Volcker policies achieve an average 
reduction of the inflation rate of 2 percentage points, at the cost of an average absolute 
output gap that is 0.7 points higher.  There is little difference between the policies in the 
simulations that begin in 1990. 
The Sacrifice Ratio  
If maintained throughout 1965-2004, the Volcker policies would have yielded an 
average inflation rate during 1984-2004 fully five percentage points lower than if the 
Greenspan policies had been maintained throughout 1965-2004.  This hypothetical   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 46 
 
Volcker accomplishment was achieved at the cost of much deeper recessions in 1975 
and 1981-82 than under the hypothetical Greenspan policies.  A standard way to 
measure this tradeoff is the “sacrifice ratio,” defined as the cumulative point years of 
lower output divided by the permanent change in the rate of inflation.  In the Table 9 
simulations that start in 1979:Q3, over the simulation through 1985:Q4 the Volcker 
policies would have delivered a cumulative annual output gap 15.2 point-years lower 
(i.e., more negative) than the Greenspan policies to achieve an inflation rate exactly 2.0 
percentage points lower in 1984:Q4 (and on average 1.97 points lower during 1986-90).  
This yields a sacrifice ratio of 15.2/2 or 7.6, much higher than casual calculations of the 
sacrifice ratio observed in the actual data.  For instance, the full-model simulation 
achieves a reduction in the four-quarter inflation rate from 9.9 percent in 1980 to 3.9 
percent in 1985, a decline of 6 percentage points, at the cost of 20.7 point years of a 
negative output gap, for a sacrifice ratio of 20.7/6.0, or 3.5. 
What accounts for the difference between the Volcker vs. Greenspan sacrifice 
ratio of 7.6 and the apparent actual ratio of 3.5?  Much of the disinflation of the early 
1980s was achieved not just by monetary policy reducing output and raising 
unemployment, but also through a reversal of supply shocks, in particular the 1981-86 
decline in oil prices and the decline in relative import prices associated with the 1980-85 
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the full inflation equation generates a reduction in the four-quarter inflation rate of 8.1 
percentage points between 1980:Q1 and 1986:Q4, compared to a reduction of 5.5 
percentage points when the supply shocks are suppressed.  In this sense about two-
thirds of the disinflation of the early 1980s was achieved by tight money and the other 
one-third by a reversal of supply shocks.  Admittedly, the supply shocks are partly 
endogenous, and some unknown fraction of the reversal of the supply shocks was in 
part a side-effect of tight monetary policy, especially that due to the appreciation of the 
dollar. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the sources of the widely noticed and discussed 
reduction in the volatility of American business cycles since the mid 1980s.  Our 
analysis of reduced volatility emphasizes the sharp decline in the standard deviation of 
changes in real GDP, of the output gap, and of the inflation rate.  A preliminary 
examination of the data supports the conclusion of the previous literature  that there 
was a break in U. S. macroeconomic behavior in 1983-84, after the end of the 1981-82 
recession.  Since then expansions have been longer, and recessions both less frequent 
and shallower.   The aim of the paper is to determine the causes of the decline in 
volatility and allocate the decline among supply shocks, demand shocks, and 
improvements in monetary policy.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 48 
 
The first substantive section of the paper divides up the economy into the eleven 
major components of spending on GDP.  At this level of disaggregation about 80 
percent of the decline in output volatility can be attributed to lower volatility in the 
eleven individual components and the remaining 20 percent to a shift in spending 
shares toward stable components, especially consumer services, and away from more 
volatile components, particularly investment in residential structures, inventory 
investment, and Federal government spending.   Taking covariances into account, these 
three sectors account for 50 percent in the reduction in the average standard deviation 
of real GDP when the 1950-83 and 1984-2004 intervals are compared, even though these 
three components accounted for only 17 percent of nominal GDP in the first interval 
and only 13 percent in the second interval. 
Up to this point the paper concludes that demand shocks played a major role in 
the reduction of volatility, particularly the reduced importance of Federal military 
spending, the financial market reforms that helped to stabilize residential investment, 
and information technology and other innovations that helped reduce the importance of 
inventory fluctuations.   Joining demand shocks as a disruptive force before 1984 were 
supply shocks that shifted the Phillips curve primarily in an upward direction before 
1981 and primarily in a downward direction after 1981.  A simple piece of evidence that 
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is provided in Figure 3 above, which shows that inflation and output volatility moved 
closely together between 1973 and 1988, but that there was ample output volatility in 
the 1950s and 1960s when inflation was relatively stable and to a lesser extent there 
were episodes of output volatility after 1988 despite the relatively stable and quiescent 
inflation rate. 
The paper develops a small macroeconomic model designed to measure the 
impact of supply shocks in the inflation equation and unidentified errors in the 
equations determining the Federal funds rate and the output gap.  The inflation 
equation included in the model builds on my own previous research, updating the so-
called “mainstream” model.  Supply shocks included in the inflation equation include 
changes in the relative price of imports, the effect of changes in food-energy prices, the 
effect of changes in medical care prices, the effect of accelerations and decelerations in 
the productivity growth trend, and the effect of the Nixon-era price controls.     
The inflation equation incorporates a natural rate of unemployment or “NAIRU” 
that varies with time; its primary movement is a decline from about 6 percent in the late 
1980s to a minimum of about 4.5 percent in the late 1990s, with an upward drift to about 
4.8 percent in 2004.  Low inflation in the 1995-2004 period is explained in the model by 
the declining NAIRU, by accelerating productivity growth, and by the role of falling 
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care effects during particular subintervals.  The inflation equation is tested not just by 
the usual criteria, i.e., significance and signs of coefficients and goodness of fit, but also 
by dynamic simulations which generate the lagged dependent variables over long 
periods of time after the sample period, 40 quarters in the simulations reported here. 
The inflation equation is joined by a second equation that determines the Federal 
Funds rate by a standard Taylor Rule specification that allows the responses of the 
funds rate to inflation and to the output gap to vary over three sub-intervals, 1960-79, 
1979-90, and 1990-2004.  The third equation relates changes in the output gap to past 
changes of the inflation rate and of the funds rate.   A symmetric analysis of shocks is 
developed.  The specific supply-shock variables in the inflation equation can be 
included or set equal to zero.  To develop a parallel treatment of shocks to interest rates 
and to the output gap, we allow the error term in those equations to be either included 
or excluded from model simulations.25 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this paper is that the biggest driver of the 
business cycle, and of reduced post-1984 output volatility, is the error term in the 
output gap equation.  Only about half of the standard deviation of actual output gap 
changes can be attributed to responses to inflation and interest rates; the remaining half 
                                            
25.  The model includes a fourth equation, a simple Okun’s law relation to create a bridge 
between the unemployment gap included in the inflation equation and the output gap that appears in the 
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is soaked up by the equation’s error term.  We interpret the output response to the 
interest rate as movements along a given IS curve, while the output errors represent 
shifts in the IS curve.   Several important historical episodes, including the Vietnam-
related large and positive output gap of the late 1960s, and the New Economy-related 
smaller but still positive output gap of the late 1990s, are exogenous events and do not 
represent responses to monetary policy.  The emphasis on the role of the output error 
term in the model is entirely consistent with and complementary to the decomposition 
analysis earlier in the paper that pointed to residential and inventory investment and to 
Federal government spending as the main sources of output volatility prior to 1984.    
The simulations of the full model provide important roles for both supply shocks 
in the inflation equation and for the error term in the output gap equation.  About 80 
percent of inflation volatility and its reduction is explained by the supply shock terms in 
the inflation equation, but also an important remaining 20 percent is explained by the 
output error term, e.g., the role of the otherwise unexplained late 1960s expansion in 
generating the acceleration of inflation from 1965 to 1971.  Similarly, the explanation of 
interest rate volatility before 1984 is also shared between supply shocks and the output 
error.  Supply shocks created inflation that generated an interest rate response, 
especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, while the output error made interest rates more 
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indirectly through the inflation term. 
The reduced volatility of business cycles, more than anything refers to output 
volatility rather than inflation or interest-rate volatility.  In explaining why the standard 
deviation of the output gap was so high before 1984 and why it declined so much, more 
than half of the explanation in the model is provided by the error term in the output gap 
equation.   Our final emphasis on “IS” shifts as sources of output volatility before 1984 
is consistent with the decomposition analysis that singled out residential and inventory 
investment, and Federal spending, as the culprits lying behind these IS shifts. 
Perhaps the most surprising result in this paper is that, when monetary policy is 
assessed solely in terms of alternative Taylor Rule reaction functions and their effect, 
there was no difference between the “Greenspan” monetary policy in effect in 1990-2004 
and the “Burns” reaction coefficients in effect in 1960-79.   Only the “Volcker” reaction 
coefficients in effect during 1979-90 represented a substantial departure.  Previous 
impressions that the Greenspan reaction function represented a desirable combination 
of aggressive fighting against both inflation and the output gap are based on statistical 
estimates plagued by positive serial correlation.  When a serial correlation correction is 
applied, the Greenspan reaction to inflation drops from an inflation-fighting value well 
above unity to an inflation-accommodation value well below unity and is little different 
from the Burns-era coefficient.     Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 53 
 
The model can be simulated to apply the Taylor rule reaction functions from the 
Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan eras to the entire 1965-2004 history.  Here we encounter 
a classic inflation-output tradeoff.  Applying the Volcker inflation-fighting coefficients 
throughout the 1965-2004 period, in contrast to applying the Greenspan coefficients to 
the full period, would have yielded a permanent reduction in the post-1984 inflation 
rate of fully 5 percentage points at the cost of much weaker output over most of the 
1974-84 period.  The sacrifice ratio calculated for the period 1980-85 from the differences 
between the outcomes of the Volcker and Greenspan policies is 7.6, compared to a 
sacrifice ratio of 3.5 in the actual data.  The paper attributes this difference to the 
reversal of adverse supply shocks during the 1981-85 interval. 
Which monetary policy was “best”?  The answer depends on the time period in 
question and the length of the time horizon.  A Volcker-like anti-inflation reaction 
function introduced in 1965 would have worsened output volatility but yielded much 
lower long-run inflation than a hypothetical Greenspan-like policy introduced in 1965.  
However, a “split” policy based on the actual historical succession of reaction functions, 
with Burns ceding to Volcker in 1979 and Volcker ceding to Greenspan in 1990, would 
have achieved the same long-run post-1984 inflation and output gap outcomes as a pure 
Volcker policy. 
Numerous qualifications and caveats are warranted.  The Greenspan policies   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 54 
 
may have the same statistical reaction function as the Burns policies but are better in 
ways that the simple interest rate equation cannot capture, including faster reactions 
(the preemptive strike against inflation in 1994 and the sharp interest rate cuts in 2001-
02).   At a deeper level, the reason the Greenspan reaction function shows a low 
“accommodative” response to inflation is that there was no inflation to be fought 
against, thanks to the beneficial set of supply shocks in operation in the late 1990s.  With 
adverse instead of beneficial shocks, the Greenspan reaction function might have 
looked much like Volcker’s.  Finally, the treatment of all supply shock terms in the 
inflation equation as exogenous needs to be qualified.  Changes in the relative price of 
imports, and to a lesser extent changes in oil prices,  reflect exchange rate movements 
that respond to monetary policy.  We conclude that a reversal of supply shocks played 
an important role in the disinflation of the early 1980s and subsequent stabilization of 
output, but that reversal was itself in part a response to the Volcker monetary policies.   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 55 
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1950-1983 1984-2005
Real GDP 3.0 1.6 51
Consumption of Durable Goods 9.4 4.9 52
Consumption of Non-Durable Goods 1.9 1.2 62
Consumption of Services 1.2 0.9 74
Equipment and Software Investment 9.1 6.7 74
Nonresidential Structures 7.0 8.4 119
Residential Structures 16.7 7.5 45
Inventory Investment
a 1.5 1.3 86
Federal Government 11.6 3.8 33
State and Local Government 2.9 1.7 57
Exports 9.7 5.3 55
Imports 8.9 5.6 63
Total Consumption 2.3 1.2 52
Total Investment 13.4 8.6 64
Total Government Spending 6.9 2.0 29
Average Share of Nominal GDP
1950-1983 1984-2005
(Percent) (Percent)
Consumption of Durable Goods 8.5 8.5 100
Consumption of Non-Durable Goods 27.3 20.6 76
Consumption of Services 26.7 38.1 143
Equipment and Software Investment 6.5 7.9 121
Nonresidential Structures 3.9 3.2 81
Residential Structures 4.9 4.5 91
Inventory Investment 0.8 0.5 59
Federal Government 11.4 7.7 68
State and Local Government 10.0 11.5 115
Exports 6.1 9.7 159
Imports -6.0 -12.1 202
Source: NIPA Tables 1.1.3., 1.1.5., 1.1.6., and 5.6.5B. 
Note: 
a. The standard deviation of inventory change is calculated by taking the first difference of real
             inventory change and dividing through by a twenty-quarter moving average of inventory change.
             This series begins in 1952:Q2 rather than in 1950:Q1.
Table 1
Standard Deviation of Four Quarter
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TABLE 2
Actual Deviations Actual Deviations Actual Shares and
and Shares and 1950-1983 Shares 1950-1983 Deviations
1950-1983 5.05 5.05 5.05
1984-2005 2.48 2.73 4.47
Difference Between
1984-2005 and 1950-83 -2.57 -2.32 -0.58
Source: NIPA Tables 1.1.3., 1.1.5., 1.1.6., and 5.6.5B. 
Decomposition of Post-1983 Decline in Real GDP Volatility Between




             TABLE 3
                                                           Standard Deviations of Four-quarter Moving
                                                                   Average of Contributions to Percent
                                                                       Change in Real GDP, 1950-2005
Difference, Percentage
1950-1983 Contribution to
1950-1983 1984-2005 vs. 1984-2005 Sum of Components
Real GDP 3.14 1.61 -1.53
Sum of Components 7.48 4.57 -2.91 100.0
Consumption of Durable Goods 0.83 0.42 -0.41 14.2
Consumption of Non-Durable Goods 0.55 0.25 -0.30 10.2
Consumption of Services 0.35 0.33 -0.02 0.7
Equipment and Software Investment 0.59 0.55 -0.05 1.6
Nonresidential Structures 0.30 0.29 0.00 0.0
Residential Structures 0.83 0.32 -0.51 17.4
Inventory Investment 1.25 0.73 -0.51 17.6
Federal Government 1.44 0.31 -1.13 38.9
State and Local Government 0.26 0.19 -0.08 2.7
Exports 0.53 0.52 -0.01 0.5
Imports 0.55 0.66 0.11 -3.8
Percent of Real GDP
GDP minus Residential Structures 2.78 1.44 -1.34 87.5
GDP minus Inventory Investment 2.44 1.33 -1.11 72.5
GDP minus Federal Government 3.18 1.61 -1.57 102.5
GDP minus Residential, Inventories, and Feder 1.93 1.19 -0.74 48.3
Source: NIPA Table 1.1.2.     Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 59 
 
 
                                                                                TABLE 4
                                                   Estimated Equations for Quarterly Changes in
                                                 the GDP and PCE Deflators, 1962:Q1 to 2004:Q4
GDP Deflator PCE Deflator
Variable Lags
1.     Lagged Dependent Variable
a 1-24 0.98 ** 1.01 **
2.     Unemployment Gap 0-4 -0.63 ** -0.56 **
3.     Relative Price of Imports 1-4 0.11 ** 0.07 **
4.     Food-Energy Effect 0-4 0.65 ** 1.04 **
5.     Medical Care Effect 0-4 1.12 ** 1.11 **
6.     Productivity Trend 0 -0.62 *   -0.71 **
7.     Nixon Controls "on" 0 -1.45 ** -1.65 **








  Mean Error -0.13 -0.05
  Root Mean-Squared Error 0.52 0.41
Notes:   (*) indicates that coefficient or sum of coefficients is significant at 5 percent level; (**) at 1 percent level.
              a) Lagged dependent variable is entered as the four-quarter moving average for lags 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21, respectively.
              b) Dynamic simulations are based on regressions for the sample period 1962:Q1-1994:Q4 in which the coefficients on the 
                        lagged dependent variable are constrained to sum to unity.  





Lags Inflation Output ment
Included Rate No Yes No Yes No Yes Gap Gap
 
Endogenous Variables
Inflation 1 to 24 0.98 **
Inflation minus Inflation Target 0 to 1 0.45 ** 0.66 ** 1.46 ** 1.55 ** 1.43 ** 0.57 *
Δ Inflation Rate 1 to 4 0.17
Federal Funds Rate Error Term 1  0.89 ** 0.70 ** 1.00 **
Δ Federal Funds Rate 2 to 10 -1.06 **
Level of Unemployment Gap 0 to 4 -0.63 **
Level of Output Gap 0 to 1 0.24 ** 0.49 ** -0.03 0.11 0.95 ** 0.60 **
Level of Output Gap 0 to 2 -0.52 **  
Exogenous Variables
Relative Import Price 1 to 4 0.11 **
Food-Energy Effect 0 to 4 0.65 **
Medical Care Effect 1 to 4 1.12 **
Productivity Trend Acceleration  0- 0 . 6 2 *
Nixon Controls "On" 0- 1 . 4 5 * *
Nixon Controls "Off" 02 . 1 9 * *
R-bar-squared 0.90 0.62 0.91 0.69 0.82 0.31 0.95 0.20 0.88
Standard Error of Estimate 0.76 1.50 0.74 1.70 1.37 1.56 0.39 0.75 0.50
Sum of Squared Residuals 82.3 165.9 39.85 126.7 71.2 130.9 7.9 87.2 41.7
Notes:   (*) indicates that coefficient or sum of coefficients is significant at 5 percent level; (**) at 1 percent level.
1979:Q2 1990:Q2 2004:Q4
Nominal Federal Funds Rate
1960:Q1 to 1979:Q3 to 1990:Q3 to
AR(1) Correction? AR(1) Correction? AR(1) Correction?
 
Table 5
Coefficients from Four-Equation Model, estimated for 1962:Q1 to 2004:Q4
Dependent Variable





Inflation Rate 2.40 1.00 41.7
FF Rate 3.63 2.49 68.6
Level of Output Gap 3.52 1.56 44.3
First Difference of Output Gap 1.10 0.54 49.1
        Simulation Results
Simulated Inflation 2.31 0.74 32.0
Simulated Inflation 1.51 0.54 35.8
       Without Supply Shocks
Contribution of Supply Shocks 2.57 0.67 26.1
Predicted FF Rate  3.63 2.49 68.3
       With Interest Error
Predicted FF Rate  3.51 2.33 66.4
       Without Interest Error
First Difference of Output Gap 1.10 0.54 49.1
       With Output Error
First Difference of Output Gap 0.53 0.31 58.5









All Shocks 2.61 1.44 55.2
No Supply Shocks 0.60 0.67 111.7
No Output Error 2.11 0.99 46.9
No Interest Error 2.58 1.55 60.1
No Shocks 0.00 0.00            --
All Shocks 3.43 1.56 45.5
No Supply Shocks 1.72 1.43 83.1
No Output Error 1.66 0.59 35.5
No Interest Error 3.08 1.50 48.7
No Shocks 0.00 0.00            --
All Shocks 3.28 1.82 55.5
No Supply Shocks 1.89 1.94 102.6
No Output Error 1.06 0.33 31.1
No Interest Error 3.12 1.88 60.3
No Shocks 0.00 0.00            --
All Shocks 5.48 2.86 52.2
No Supply Shocks 3.41 4.15 121.7
No Output Error 3.23 1.31 40.6
No Interest Error 5.40 2.82 52.2
No Shocks 2.00 2.00 100.0
All Shocks 2.64 1.81 68.6
No Supply Shocks 1.77 1.69 95.5
No Output Error 1.28 0.84 65.6
No Interest Error 2.58 1.87 72.5
No Shocks 0.00 0.00            --
Average Inflation Rate
Average Absolute Value of Output Gap
Table 7
Split-sample Taylor Rule, 1965:Q1 to 2004:Q4
Standard Deviations of Full-Model Specifications,
Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate
Standard Deviation of Fed Funds Rate
Standard Deviation of Output Gap






Split-Sample Coefficients 2.61 1.44 55.2
Burns 2.62 1.26 48.1
Volcker 2.09 1.14 54.5
Greenspan 3.08 1.08 35.1
Split-Sample Coefficients 3.43 1.56 45.5
Burns 1.62 1.41 87.0
Volcker 2.73 1.49 54.6
Greenspan 1.56 1.39 89.1
Split-Sample Coefficients 3.28 1.82 55.5
Burns 2.25 1.98 88.0
Volcker 3.39 2.44 72.0
Greenspan 2.04 1.96 96.1
Split-Sample Coefficients 5.48 2.87 52.4
Burns 5.63 5.53 98.2
Volcker 4.44 2.81 63.3
Greenspan 6.53 7.92 121.3
Split-Sample Coefficients 2.64 1.91 72.3
Burns 1.90 1.78 93.7
Volcker 2.78 2.15 77.3
Greenspan 1.94 1.72 88.7
Standard Deviation of Output Gap
Average Inflation Rate
Average Absolute Value of Output Gap
Table 8
Split-Sample Coefficients and Full-Sample Coefficients for Taylor Rule
Standard Deviations of Full-Model Specifications,
Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate
Standard Deviation of Fed Funds Rate
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Simulation Simulation
Starts in Starts in
1979:Q3 1990:Q3
















    
Burns 1.69 2.12
Volcker 2.38  2.47
Greenspan 1.65 2.09
Standard Deviation of Output Gap
Average Inflation Rate
Average Absolute Value of Output Gap
Table 9
Alternative Starting Dates and Coefficients for Taylor Rule
Standard Deviations of Full-Model Specifications,
Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate
Standard Deviation of Fed Funds Rate
 
   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 65 
 






























Actual Real GDP 
Growth
Average Real GDP 
Growth





















   Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 66 
 
















































t  Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 67 
 











1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Growth Volatility
Inflation Volatility  Decline in Business Cycle Volatility, Page 68 
 
Figure 4A. Four Quarter Average of Import 
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Figure 8. Simulated Inflation with and without Supply Shocks,
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